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Abstract: 
From the moment we wake up in the morning to the moment we go to sleep at night, we are 
almost constantly making decisions. From the simple, such as brushing our teeth before bed, to 
the complex, for example planning our retirement, decisions play an important role in our daily 
lives. Despite this, it is not very often that we take time to think about how we go about making 
our decisions in order to achieve the best possible outcomes. This paper explores theories which 
attempt to describe the ways in which we make decisions. The first two sections explore 
economic decisions made at the individual level. The next two sections explore decision making 
in a more macroeconomic context. Finally, the paper ends with a section that introduces certain 
aspects of game theory and explores two macroeconomic games. 
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Introduction: 
Consider the situation we all face the moment we wake up in the morning. The alarm 
clock is going off, the room is dark, and the bed is warm and inviting. The first thing that we do 
at this moment is decide whether to shut off the alarm clock or to hit the snooze button and allow 
ourselves another five minutes in our cozy beds. Sometimes this situation is repeated several 
times before we actually decide to shut off the alarm, climb out of bed, and begin our day. In this 
manner, we all begin by making a decision the moment we wake up in the morning, albeit a very 
simple decision. If we take a moment to consider our typical day, we can conclude that our lives 
our filled with situations in which we must make decisions. Some of these decisions are 
relatively simple, such as our initial decision to get up in the morning. Other decisions we make 
can be extremely complex, for example when we meet with a financial adviser to establish a long 
term plan of saving money for retirement. Regardless of the complexity level, the decisions we 
make are most often aimed at achieving an optimal outcome given the conditions we face. 
Despite this pervasiveness of decision making in our lives, it is not often that we take 
time to think about the processes we use to make these decisions. In this paper, we will endeavor 
to accomplish this task by exploring several decision making conditions, both at an individual 
level and at an institutional level. The paper will be organized to flow generally from less 
complex ideas into more complicated ideas, exploring each in detail and discussing any 
implications that result from those ideas. The first two sections develop the decision making 
process and explore applications at the level of individual people or firms. The third and fourth 
sections shift focus toward big picture, institutional decision making. The final section introduces 
concepts from game theory and their application to institutional decision making. 
1. Cases Where Optimal Decisions Depend upon the Actions of Others: 
It is often the case that the decisions people make are not as simple as choosing between 
two or more actions where the outcome of each action is known. In fact, many decisions that are 
made every day follow the form of one person or institution (hereafter referred to as an agent) 
trying to make an optimal choice. Agents do this by establishing one or more criteria, but the 
optimal choice is often dependent on the actions or decisions of another agent. In such situations, 
two important factors must be considered by an agent. First, the agent must establish criteria to 
distinguish between choices. Second, the actions of other agents must be considered within these 
criteria. Once these two factors have been considered, the task of decision making becomes a 
process of comparing choices. The comparison is based on both the established criteria and the 
other agent's actions. The comparison is followed by selecting the choice which yields the 
optimal outcome. This decision making process can transition from a relatively simple to a rather 
complex exercise when the actions of another agent must also be considered. To demonstrate this 
phenomenon, two examples will be examined. Both examples will begin with a relatively simple 
decision based only on one criterion, followed by a transition to a more complex process based 
on the criterion and the actions of another agent. 
Suppose that John and Fred are playing tennis. John has served the ball and Fred has 
made a return hit which John is now preparing to strike. The players are positioned as shown in 
Figure 1.1 (J & F I)' Based on the current situation, Joh n knows he can h it a baseline shot 
(represented by S, in Figure 1.1) or a drop shot (S] in Figure 1.1). John's criterion for shot 
selection is such that he wants to hit the ball to where Fred has the lowest probability of being 
able to make a return shot. If Fred has a 50% chance of returning the ball from S, and a 30% 
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chance of returning the ball from S2, then John 's selection criterion indicates he should choose S2 
for the shot. At this point, it should be noted that John's decision is concerned on Iy with the 
selection criterion and does not consider the actions Fred may take before John strikes the ball. 
Let us now add Fred 's actions to the decision making process. 
To add this second dimension to the situation, let us start by assuming that Fred has two 
actions that he may take before John hits the ball. He may either remain on the baseline in 
position F I,or he may rush the net, moving to position F2. John must now alter his decision 
making process to include Fred's actions. As before, if Fred is at F I, he has a 50% chance of 
returning the baseline shot S, and a 30% chance of returning the drop shot S2, so John should hit 
the drop shot. However, if Fred chooses to move to position F2, he then has a 60% chance of 
return ing John 's shot to S, and a 75% chance of returning John's shot to S2. Based on Fred 's 
action, John should now choose the baseline shot at S, over the drop shot at S1 in order to 
minimize Fred's chance of returning the shot. 
Figure 1.1 
S, F 1 
S F2 2 
J 
Let us now consider a more economic example involving the strategies of competing 
firms. Suppose a rural region of a country has experienced considerable development and 
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expansion over the past several years. As a result, demand for electricity has increased beyond 
the capacity of the current power plant in the region which is owned by Power Supply, Inc. (PSI). 
Big Electric Corporation (BEC) has taken note of the opportunity and has initiated the 
construction of a new power plant in the area. BEC may construct either a large plant L or a 
small plant S. BEC's criterion for size selection is the expected profitability of the new plant, 
with higher expected profitability corresponding to a more optimal decision . Table 1.1 displays 
the expected profitability (in millions of dollars) for each company, depending on BEC's choice 
of plant size (S or L) . The first numbers of the right hand column in Table 1.1 correspond to 
BEC's profitability, the second to that of PSI. For example, if BEC chooses S, both BEC and PSI 
can expect a profit of$5 miHion each. Conversely, if BEC chooses L, it can expect a profit of$8 
million while PSI 's expected profit is only $2 million. Based on this informatio n, BEC's optimal 
decision is to construct a large plant. 
To complicate the situation, let us assume that PSI has also taken notice of the increased 
demand for electricity. PSI does not want to build an additional facility in the region, but it does 
have the option of expanding its current small plant to a large plant before BEC beings 
construction . This complicates BEC's decision, because if both companies choose to operate 
large power plants in the region , supply of electricity will increase to the point that there will be 
considerable downward pressure on electricity prices. The reduction in price will in turn make 
the large power plants unprofitable in the region. This situation is modeled in Table 1.2. The left 
hand column represents BEC's choice to build a small S or large L plant. The top row represents 
PSI's choice to not expand N or expand E. Again, the first numbers in Table 1.2 relate to BEC's 
expected profits, the second numbers to PSI. It should be clear that BEC must carefully consider 
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PSI's decision of whether or not the current plant will be expanded. This is because if PSI plays 
conservatively and decides not to expand N, then it is in BEC 's best interest to build a large plant 
and again expect $8 million in profit while PSI expects only $2 million. However, if PSI is 
aggressive and does expand E, then the optimal choice for BEC is to build a small plant. This is 
the case because building a large plant results in an expected loss of $5 million, while building a 
small plant results in an expected profit of$2 million for BEe. 
Table 1.1 Table 1.2 
I BEC~ PSI~ 
'I . 
BEC PSI N I E ! - , , 
S 5 5 S 5 5 2 8 
" , 
L 8 2 !- . L 8 2 -5 -5 
2. An Introduction and Exploration of the Permanent Income Hypothesis: 
While understanding the decision making framework of competing tennis players or 
electricity firms may be helpful given certain situations, these decisions are by nature relatively 
small in scale. Let us now expand our scope to gain an understanding of the decision making 
framework that relates to factors which have a significant impact on entire economies. These 
decision making frameworks are arguably more helpful. One such factor that can have a large 
magnitude effect on economies is consumption . Unfortunately, the concepts that underlie 
consumption decisions are more complex and less intuitive than those already discussed. To 
exacerbate this problem, there have been multiple theories regarding consumption developed 
throughout history. For the sake of time and clarity, just one of these theories will be discussed. 
This particular theory was set forth by Modigliani and Brumberg, and further developed by 
Friedman. The theory is called the Permanent Income Hypothesis. Let us first momentarily 
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depart from the study of decision making to develop the ideas in the Permanent income 
Hypothesis. Once this has been accomplished, some examples can be explored which 
demonstrate the influence the theory has on optimal consumption decisions. 
The idea behind Permanent Income Hypothesis is that consumption is a far more 
complex decision than simply basing current consumption on current income. The theory argues 
that agents base their consumption over a much longer income time horizon . Consider a recently 
married couple who are buying a house. It is unlikely that they have the means to afford this 
consumption based entirely on current income. They are likely to use past income (in the form of 
savings), current income, and future income (in the form of loans) to finance their consumption. 
This single act of consumption is a highly complex decision based on a long time horizon which 
includes a mix of past income saved, present income earned, and future income foregone. 
The idea of planning consumption over a long period of time can be expanded to include 
agents in all stages of life. It is able explain why college students are willing to accumulate so 
much debt, why people in the workforce often spend less than they earn (i.e. they save), and why 
people retire and live off of what they have saved in their working years. This idea begs for a 
conceptual framework that can describe how agents make decisions regarding consumption 
based not only on their current income but also on past income saved and perceived future 
income. This conceptual framework is called permanent income, which, predictably, was 
developed in the Permanent Income Hypothesis. In its simplest form, permanent income is 
defined by the equation: 
Permanent Income (PI) Tota! Lifetime Income 
Tala! Lifetime 
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Annual Consumption( C) 
Let us take a close look at this equation. Because total income is divided evenly among 
each year of life, this equation implies that there is perfect smoothing in consumption. In other 
words, even though income may vary over the course of a lifetime (i.e. people usually earn lower 
incomes when they are very young and very old), consumption does not vary. While the idea of 
smoothed consumption is at least plausible, the idea that consumption is perfectly smoothed is 
probably erroneous. Perfect smoothing is depicted in Figure 2.1 below. Notice consumption does 
not change at all as income changes. Casual empirical observation contradicts the notion of 
perfect smoothing occurring in the real world, where agents generally increase consumption as 
income increases. This more realistic case is depicted in Figure 2.2. Note that consumption does 
rise as income rises, but there is still some smoothing that occurs. The important takeaway from 
this discussion is that permanent income hypothesis describes a consumption curve that is 
relatively flat in comparison to the income curve. 
Figure 2.1 Figure 2.2 
Consumption 
Consumption 
$ $ 
Income Income 
Time Time 
Aside from the plausibility of the occurrence of perfect smoothing, there are two 
additional problems that the permanent income equation has. The first of these is that total 
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lifetime income assumes that an agent knows how much income will be made during working 
years. The second problem is that total lifetime assumes that an agent knows how long he or she 
is going to live. While these assumptions are of course preposterous, they do not render the idea 
of permanent income completely inadequate for two reasons. 
The first reason is that enough information is available for free from several sources 
about careers and health to reasonably estimate an annual income and an expected lifetime. For 
example, consider an 18-year old American female contemplating entering college to become a 
registered nurse. She knows that she will live about 80 years, and if she pursues a nursing degree 
she can expect an annual income of about $60,000. Let us ignore interest rates, any inheritance 
she wants to leave her children, and the possibility of periods of unemployment. At the same 
time, we will assume that she will work for 45 years. Her permanent income is then calculated as 
such: 
Permanent Income $60,000X45 years "'" $ 43,500 80 years- I 8 years 
Ifshe chooses not to attend college her salary would be in the neighborhood of$30,000 (the 
average income of those with only a high school diploma). However, because she is not going to 
college she gains another 4 years of income. Her permanent income is then: 
Permanent Income = $ 30,000 X 49 years "'" $ 24 000 
80 years- 18 years ' 
Thus, if she chooses to go to college she is raising her permanent income, and therefore her 
consumption, substantially. If she is only concerned with maximizing consumption, she should 
choose to go to college (of course, there are many other factors that weigh in on this decision). 
The second reason that the idea behind permanent income is valid, despite our 
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oversimplification, is that while agents may not explicitly calculate permanent income as we did 
above, they may do so implicitly. In other words, even though agents might not go through the 
process of calculating permanent income, they might use common sense and logic to lead them 
to the same consumption decisions. For example, most students entering college probably do not 
determine how much debt to accumulate based on how much a college education will increase 
their permanent income. What they probably do determine is that a college education will mean 
they can earn a higher income. This in turn likely means they will be able to both payoff their 
school debt, and also consume more than they would have been able to had they not gone to 
college. The end result is that consumption decisions are the same whether permanent income is 
explicitly calculated or not. 
Let us now examine some numerical examples to see what effects the Permanent Income 
Hypothesis and unexpected income changes (the actions of others) have on optimal consumption 
decisions. First, let us divide the life of an agent into three periods based on income (I). The early 
period (E) includes the higher education or the early career stages of life where little or no 
income is earned. For our purposes, let us suppose that income in this period is $15,000The 
middle period (M) includes the working years where income peaks and most of the total lifetime 
income is earned. Let us assume an income of $60,000 in this period for our example. The late 
period (L) includes the years of retirement and old age where income is again low and agents 
live mostly off of savings. For simplicity, let us suppose that income during this period is 
$15,000. Let us again ignore interest rates and inheritances. Let us also make the assumption that 
permanent income (PI) is after tax permanent income and that consumption in each year is equal 
to permanent income (C = PI). Using our formula, let us quickly calculate permanent income, 
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shown below: 
P 1 $ 15,000+$60,000+$ 15,000 $30000 
ermanent ncome = 3 ' = , 
Table 2.1 shows the base consumption decisions that will be used to compare 
consumption decisions in other situations. It displays the income and permanent income earned 
in each period. 
Base 
I 
PI=C 
. , 
Table 2.1 
E 
$15,000 
$30,000 
M 
$60,000 
$30,000 
L t- $15,000 
. $30,000 
It should be noted that, if the Permanent Income Hypothesis holds, consumption is much more 
even over lifetime than is income (in this case, consumption is perfectly smoothed). Also, agents 
who are in the early or late periods are spending more than they earn. That is, they depend either 
on credit markets or past saving to consume at their permanent income level. From this, we can 
conclude that the aggregate saving in an economy is at least partly dependent on the number of 
agents in their middle period. More generally, it can be said that demographics can have an 
important role in consumption and saving. For instance, countries that have young or aging 
populations (most people are in the (E) or (L) period) are most likely going to have lower rates of 
saving than do countries with a higher proportion of middle aged people. One way this can affect 
the economy is due to the fact that investment is related to savings. For a real world example, let 
us look at the United States. Figure 2.3 displays the median age of U.S . Citizens over time. 
Permanent Income Hypothesis would predict an aging population to have a falling savings rate. 
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Note that the median age has been slowly increasing over the last century, despite some 
fluctuations . Now consider Figure 2.4, which shows the average personal savings rate of the 
United States over time. Note that since about 1980, the savings rate has experienced a trend of 
significant decline. Referring back to Figure 2.3, the age of the United States has seen a 
relatively rapid increase since 1980. While these two facts alone do not prove that the Permanent 
Income Hypothesis is correct in stating that older populations cause lower savings rates, they do 
indicate a possible correlation. 
Figure 2.3 
Median Age of United States 
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Now let us look at what happens to consumption decisions when income changes 
unexpectedly. These changes can take the form of either temporary changes or permanent 
changes. Let us consider an example of each. Suppose that in the early period, an agent wins the 
lottery and receives a lump sum of $30,000. Other than this, the agent earns the same amount of 
income as in Table 2. I during the middle and late periods. That is, there is a temporary increase 
in income in the early period. Let us now recalculate permanent income, taking this change into 
account. This is shown below: 
P 1 $45,000+$60,000+$15,000 $40000 
ermanent ncome = 3 =, 
The effect on permanent income and consumption decisions is shown in Table 2.2 below. 
I Temporary 
1 
PI=C 
E 
$45,000 
$40,000 
12 
M 
$60,000 
$40,000 
l L 
! .. - . ... - - --
$15,000 
$40,000 
In terms of consumption decisions, the temporary increase of $30,000 in income is divided 
equally among the three periods. In comparison to Table 2.1, consumption increases by 33 
percent. More importantly, it should be observed that consumption in each period increases by 
less than the full $30,000 amount of the lottery winnings. 
Now suppose that the lottery is designed such that the agent receives $30,000 in each 
period. With this change in mind, let us again calculate permanent income, shown below: 
P tl $45,000+$90,000+$45,000 $60000 ermanen ncome = 3 =, 
The effect of this change is summarized in Table 2.3. 
Permanent 
PI=C 
Table 2.3 
E 
$45,000 
$60,000 
M 
$90,000 
$60,000 
L 
$45,000 
$60,000 
In comparison to Table 2.1, we can see that consumption has increased by 100 percent. More 
noteworthy is the observation that consumption in each period has increased by the full $30,000 
payment received. By comparing Tables 2.2 and 2.3, we can see that, while income is the same 
in the early period ($45,000), consumption is substantially higher ($60,000 as opposed to 
$40,000). From this we can conclude that the Permanent Income Hypothesis implies that 
permanent changes to income have a much greater impact on optimal consumption decisions 
than do temporary changes. This implication is of great importance to the discussion of the 
following sections. 
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3. An Introduction of Uncertainty and Application to Tax Policy: 
In the previous section, we related the decision making process to the Permanent Income 
Hypothesis in an attempt to describe a how agents make their consumption decisions. We then 
explored ways in which agents can make these decisions both explicitly and implicitly. 
Consumption decisions were expanded to cover a longer time horizon (specifically one lifetime), 
and the section was concluded with a discussion of how changes in income affect consumption 
decisions in the remaining periods of an agent's life. The change in income was assumed to be 
caused by an agent winning the lottery. Recall that the method by which the lottery winnings 
were transferred to the agent had a significant impact on the changes in the agent's optimal 
consumption decisions. A lottery which uti lized a one time payment scheme created only a 
temporary change in the agent's income, and it was distributed equally among the remaining 
periods in the agent's lifetime. A lottery which paid the winnings in each period created a 
permanent change to the agent's income in each period, and had a much larger effect on optimal 
consumption decisions during the remaining periods of the agent's life. 
While the lottery examples may be illustrative in showing the mechanism behind 
consumption decisions formulated in the Permanent Income Hypothesis, there are two problems 
with the examples. The first problem is that the changes in the agent's income were due to the 
agent's luck in winning the lottery. This is too unrealistic if the idea is to be expanded and 
applied to the decisions of all agents that make up an economy. A new, more realistic impetus for 
change in income must be discovered in order to help validate the applicability of the theory laid 
out in the previous section. The second and most important problem is that the lottery examples 
implied that the agent knew with certainty how the lottery winnings were going to be transferred. 
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In fact, this was the entire basis for the difference in the agent's optimal consumption decisions. 
It is often the case that the real world is not so certain. This creates a need to incorporate 
uncertainty into the theory in order to make it more applicable. The first part of this section will 
be dedicated to solving the two problems just outlined. The incorporation of these solutions will 
lead us to another important concept, called time inconsistency. That concept will be the focus of 
the latter half of the section. 
First, let us address the issue of realistic causes for changes in income. Significant lottery 
jackpots are simply not won by enough people to expand the ideas of permanent income and 
optimal consumption decisions to a national economy. Fortunately, there are many occurrences 
that can affect incomes. The challenge is to choose an occurrence that affects an entire economy 
simultaneously (i.e. it affects a large number of people at about the same time). To do this we 
take into consideration government taxation policies. Suppose that a recently elected public 
official believes that after tax incomes are too low and wants to lower taxes in order to put more 
money into public hands (the publ ic being made up of a multitude of economic agents). There 
are two kinds of policies that the public official could adopt. One policy is to create a temporary 
tax break, while the other policy is to adopt a permanent tax break. Both policies constitute an 
increase in after tax income to a large amount of economic agents during one time period. This 
solves our first problem of determining a more realistic impetus for changes to income . 
Next, let us address the issue of certainty. There are a multitude of ways to incorporate 
uncertainty into the agent's decision making process, but let us endeavor to do it in a relatively 
simple manner. This can be done by building incomplete information into the structure of the tax 
break policy. To do this, assume that when the public official is elected to office, it is given that a 
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tax break policy of one of the two forms mentioned above will be passed by the legislature. Let T 
denote the government selecting a temporary tax break policy and P denote the selection of a 
permanent tax break policy. Further assume that the policy wi II not be passed until late in the 
year (i .e. after the public has made its consumption decisions). Because of this feature, the public 
must form one of two expectations at the beginn ing of the year. Fi rst, the publ ic can expect the 
tax break policy to be temporary, represented by t. Second, the public can expect the tax break 
policy to be permanent, represented by p. 
Before we explore the outcomes that result from different combinations of tax break 
policies and public expectations, there is one important issue that needs to be addressed. Let us 
call it the issue of heterogeneity in human expectation. We have so far made an implicit 
assumption that all of the agents in the economy are forming the same expectations about the 
government's tax break policy, so that expectations are homogeneous. In reality, humans disagree 
with each other and form different opinions and expectations in nearly every aspect of life. This 
fact, however, does not destroy the validity of the implications for the scenario we have built. 
While all of the agents in the economy may not have the same expectation for tax break policy, 
there is a likelihood that a majority of agents, large or small, will have the same expectation. This 
only changes the magnitudes, rather than the characteristics, of the outcomes to our scenario. 
Let us now discuss the outcomes that result from the different combinations of tax break 
policies and public expectations. There are four possible outcomes, summarized in the tables 
below. The letters in the top left cell of each table represent the tax break policy selected by the 
government and the expectation that the public has about the tax break policy. The letters on the 
left are either Tor P, while the letters on the right are either t or p. Remember that the capitalized 
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letters represent the government's policy selection and the lower case letters represent the 
expectations of agents. 
The first two tables should look familiar. Table 3.1 is similar the case where the lottery 
winnings were temporary. In this scenario, the government has chosen a temporary tax break 
policy, and the public expected the government to choose this policy. The resulting consumption 
decisions made by the agent are identical to those made in Table 2.2 of the previous section. 
Table 3.2 is similar to the case where the lottery winnings were paid in each period. In this 
scenario, the government has chosen a permanent tax break, and the public expected the 
government to choose this policy. The consumption decisions that result are identical to those of 
Table 2.3 in the previous section. 
T , I 
-- - - - .- - - -
PI=C 
P,p 
i I ~-.-.- P-I=C 
Table 3.1 
E M 
$45,000 I $60,000 
- t- .. -._- --. --
$40,000 $40,000 
Table 3.2 
E 
$45,000 
$60,000 
M 
$90,000 
$60,000 
. J . 
L 
$15,000 
$40,000 
L 
$45,000 
$60,000 
I 
. ! 
. - .I 
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 are substantially different. In Table 3.3, the the government 
selected T, the temporary tax break policy, while the public selected p , expecting the government 
to employ the permanent tax break policy. The result of this discrepancy between reality and 
public expectations cause a large increase in consumption during the early period but no increase 
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to consumption in the middle and late periods. This occurs because the public acts as if the tax 
break policy is permanent in the early period, and consume all of the additional income from the 
tax break. We can model this decision by using the permanent income equation for expectations 
of a permanent tax break. This equation is: 
P 1 $ 45,000+$90,000+$ 45,000 $ 60000 
ermanent ncome = 3 =, 
In the middle period, after the public recognizes that the tax break policy was temporary, it must 
adjust its expectations and recalculate permanent income for the middle and late periods. To do 
this, it must take into account the $15,000 loan incurred during the early period by subtracting it 
from income earned in the middle and late periods. This new calculation is shown below: 
P 1 $60,000+$ 15,000-$15,000 $"'0000 
ermanent ncome = 2 = -', 
The process we have just completed is summarized in Table 3.3, which shows the income earned 
in each period, as well as the corresponding consumption decisions. 
Table 3.3 
T,p -:r - E M L 
I 
I 
$45,000 $60,000 $15,000 
PI=C $60,000 $30,000 $30,000 
In Table 3.4, the government selected P, the permanent tax break policy, while the public 
selected t, indicating that expectations for the government to use the temporary tax break policy. 
The result of the divergence between reality and the public's expectations in this situation was a 
small increase in consumption during the early period and a relatively large increase in 
consumption during the middle and late periods. This occurs due to the fact that in the early 
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period, the agents act as if the increase to income is temporary, therefore distributing the gain 
equally amongst all three periods. In terms of a permanent income equation, this is represented 
by the following calculation: 
P 1 $ 45,000 + $ 60,000 + $ 15,000 $ 40 000 
ermanent ncome = 3 =, 
In the middle period, after the public recognizes that the tax break policy was permanent, it must 
adjust expectations and distribute the remaining permanent income to optimize consumption 
decisions in the middle and late periods. The permanent income calculation for this adjustment is 
shown below: 
P 1 $90,000+$45,000+$5,000 $70000 
ermanent ncome = 2 =, 
Table 3.4 below summarizes what we have just discussed. 
TabJe 3.4 
P , I E M L 
I $45,000 $90,000 $45,000 
PI=C $40,000 $70,000 t $70,000 ; 
... 
It should be noted that each scenario discussed in this section represents an extreme 
example, where the public was either completely correct in its expectations or completely wrong. 
However, it is completely possible (and probable) that agents select consumption levels which 
are in between the values depicted in the tables. In this respect, what the tables represent are 
boundaries. They demonstrate scenarios where expectations perfectly match reality and where 
expectations are perfectly contrary to reality. In practice, what actually occurs is located 
somewhere between the boundaries that we have established. 
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Two important conclusions can be drawn from the above examples. First of all, including 
uncertainty into the model of consumption decisions creates the potential for situations where 
consumption decisions are not optimal. These are situations where the agent does not evenly 
distribute permanent income between all three periods, and this happens due to uncertainty of the 
government selection of tax break pol icy. The second and more interesting conclusion is that it is 
not the tax break policy selected by the government that matters. It is the expectation of the agent 
that matters in determining consumption decisions. To illustrate this conclusion, let us take 
another look at the tax break policy example. Note that in both Table 3.1 and Table 3.4, the agent 
expects the government to pursue a temporary tax break policy, and makes the same 
consumption decision in the early period. The consumption decision is the same even though the 
government selected different tax break policies in the two situations. Similarly, in both Table 3.2 
and Table 3.3, the agent expects a permanent tax break policy to be selected, and makes the same 
consumption decision in the early period for both situations. Again, different policies were 
actually selected by the government in the two scenarios. To reemphasize the importance of the 
conclusion, it should be again stated that what matters in determining consumption decisions is 
not the tax break policy the government selects but rather the expectation of which policy the 
government will select. 
4. An Introduction to Time Inconsistency and Application to Discretionary Policy: 
In the previous section, it was shown that when agents have incomplete information, their 
short run (i.e. early period) expectations may be incorrect, leading to suboptimal consumption 
decisions. In the middle period, the agents saw that the tax break policy was either temporary or 
permanent, and adjusted their expectations accordingly. In other words, while in the short run 
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(early period) the public expectations could be wrong, in the long run (middle and late periods) 
agents adjusted their expectations to be correct. This has important implications for the 
government's optimal choice of policy. Because agents change their expectations over time, 
governments often face a complex issue, which has been described as the problem of time 
inconsistency. 
Before we begin to discuss an example of the time inconsistency problem, let us first 
create a better definition of what the problem is. Up to this point in our analysis we have only 
considered optimal decision making on the part of the public (made up of many agents). 
However, governments are also agents, and they have goals and agendas which they want to 
optimize on as well. One way governments do this is through the form of discretionary policy 
decisions (such as the tax break policy from the previous section). If the government's optimal 
decision for policy in the short run is the same as the optimal decision in the long run, then the 
long run policy is said to be time consistent. Conversely, if the government's optimal policy 
decision in the short run differs from that of the long run, then the long run policy is said to be 
time inconsistent (Romp 118). Let us now build an example to demonstrate the conditions that 
can lead to time inconsistent policy decisions. 
Suppose the discretionary policy in question is the targeting of output (income) levels. 
Let us make the example fairly simple by assuming that the government has only two options for 
its policy decision. The government (represented by G) can either choose a moderate policy, 
designated as M, or an aggressive policy, designated as A. Further assume the M is the 
equilibrium level of output and that A is a level of output above the equilibrium. I fthe 
government chooses an aggressive targeting policy, inflation will increase because output is 
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above the equilibrium level. In this scenario, the private sector (represented by PS), made up of 
agents, can choose between two expectations for the amount of inflation, where H denotes 
expectations of high inflation and L denotes expectations of low inflation. 
With a framework of the scenario in place, we can now detai I the progression of events. 
At the beginning of the period, the private sector much choose to expect either high inflation or 
low inflation. With the knowledge of what the private sector has chosen, the government is then 
free to choose a moderate or aggressive targeting policy. In this situation, the government and the 
private sector each have two possible choices, so there are four possible combinations of choices. 
Each combination of choices is associated with a payoff for both the government and the private 
sector. Let us make the assumption that agents are interested in maximizing their payoffs. 
Now, let us determine the payoffs for both agents. Suppose that the private sector is only 
interested in whether or not the expectation it has matches the inflation actually experienced. I fit 
is, the payoff is I . If not, the payoff is O. Note that when output is at the equilibrium, inflation 
will be as expected (Carlin 641). A few key assumptions must be made about the government's 
preferences before discussing its payoffs. I f the expected inflation rate is low, then the 
government would prefer to choose a slightly higher inflation rate in order to pursue an 
aggressive targeting policy. However, when expected inflation is high, the government would 
prefer to keep inflation as low as possible by choosing a moderate policy (Carlin 641). The 
government's payoffs can now be formu lated based on these preferences. I f the private sector 
expects high inflation, then a moderate policy has a payoff of 2, while an aggressive policy has a 
payoff of I. If the private sector expects a low inflation, then an aggressive policy has a payoff of 
4, while a moderate policy has a payoff of3. 
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Now it is time to put aJJ of the information together into a visual chart, which will make it 
easier to derive insights from the four possible outcomes. Figure 4.1 displays the information 
below. 
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Figure 4.1 should be viewed in the following way. Each box is called a decision node, 
with the letters inside the node representing the agent whose turn it is to make a decision. The 
letters next to each line represent a decision, and the numbers at the bottom represent the payoffs 
for each agent (the top number corresponding to PS, the bottom to G). The progression begins 
with the top decision node, and PS chooses either H or L. Depending on the choice, we move 
down either the left or right line, at which point we reach a decision node for G. Then G makes 
its decision between M or A, and we move down the corresponding line to the associated payoffs. 
At this point, the progression has finished and the payoffs for each agent can be analyzed. 
For the government G, there is an ideal progression which would allow it to maximize its 
payoff. This happens when the private sector PS chooses L. When this happens, the government 
wi I I get a payoff of either 3 or 4, both of wh ich are better payoffs than the government could 
receive should the private sector choose H. To insure this outcome, at the beginning of the period 
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the government may promise the private sector that it will choose a moderate policy (M) if the 
private sector chooses L. Given that each group is trying to maximize its payoff, the private 
sector can give no credibility to the government's promise, because if the private sector chooses 
L then the government will chooseA in order to maximize its payoff. This would leave the 
private sector with a less than optimal payoff itself. Faced with this knowledge, we must seek to 
find out the optimal decision for the private sector. If the private sector chooses H, then the 
government will choose M in order to maximize its payoff. The private sector will receive a 
payoff of I based on this action, thus maximizing its payoff. ln light of this reasoning, we can 
conclude that the best choice for the private sector is H. 
At this point, it may appear that the idea of time inconsistency has been lost, though in 
reality it has not. The problem that the government has is that it cannot credibly commit itself to 
a targeting policy until the private sector has set its expectations. This is because it cannot 
maximize its payoff if it holds to its commitment on targeting policy. The government's optimal 
policy in the short run (beginning of the period) is Mbecause this could induce the private sector 
into choosing L, thereby ensuring the government's ability to maximize its payoff. Unfortunately, 
in order to achieve that maximum payoff, the government must deviate from its optimal short run 
pol icy of M and choose its long run optimal pol icy of A. The government's optimal long run 
policy differs from its optimal short run policy, which matches the definition of a time 
inconsistent policy developed near the beginning of this section. The reason for why rationally 
driven agents PS and G cannot coordinate their choices in order to achieve a more optimal joint 
outcome is not yet apparent. This issue is discussed in the following section. 
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5. An Introduction of Game Theory and Two Macroeconomic Games: 
The previous section was concluded with a brief discussion of how both the private sector 
and the government made optimal decisions given our assumed conditions, and why the 
government's optimal policies were time inconsistent. In this section, we will begin by 
introducing game theory into our time inconsistency situation. Next, certain concepts of game 
theory will be examined more closely. Finally, the section will end with the discussion ofa new 
game to introduce more game theory topics and applications. 
Let us begin by defining what exactly a game is. There are three conditions that are 
necessary to have a game. First, a game must consist a set of two or more players (or agents). 
Second, each player must have a set of moves (or choices) available to them. Finally, there must 
be a specification of payoffs to each player for each combination of moves (Fudenberg 4). There 
are several ways in which games can be represented, but for our purposes we will use extensive 
form because it is more intuitive and yields the same end results after analysis. In addition to the 
three conditions of games described above, extensive form games display three additional pieces 
of information. The first is the order that players move (i.e. who moves when). The second is the 
information that each player has available when making a choice. The third is a probability 
distribution of any exogenous events (Fudenberg 77). We will begin our discussion of game 
theory by re-examining the game between the private sector and the government from the 
previous section. 
Figure 5. I is essentially identical to Figure 4. I, but we will now use game theory to 
"solve" the game by using a method called backward induction. This method is applicable to 
extensive-form games that have a defined number of moves. We begin by considering the 
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decision nodes where, after the player chooses a move, the game ends. These are called terminal 
decision nodes, and there are two of them in Figure 5.1. These are the two G decision nodes. For 
each of these terminal decision nodes, the optimal choice for the player at that point is evident 
because we can see the payoffs associated with each choice. For example, at the left hand 
decision node G, the government chooses M because its payoff is 2, whereas the payoff for 
choosing A is only 1. The optimal choice for each terminal decision node is characterized by a 
thick dashed line, which can be seen in Figure 5.1 The same process is repeated for all remaining 
terminal decision nodes (in our case there is only one more, the right hand G decision node). 
Having done this for all terminal decision nodes, we then move up the game tree to the 
next level of decision nodes . In our case, this is the PS decision node, and it is the only node at 
this level. The payoff associated with each choice for PS can be seen because we have already 
determined what G will do for either of the choices PS can make. The payoff to PS from 
choosing Lis 0, because if L is selected G will chooseA. Using similar rationale it can be seen 
that the payoff to PS from choosing H is I. Thus, H is the optimal choice for PS, so we make the 
line associated with that choice a thick dashed line . At this point, there are no further decision 
nodes to consider; the game has been solved. The solution moves down the thick dashed lines 
from the start of the game until it ends at the payoffs. This path is called the equilibrium path 
solution (EPS) of the game (Friedman 47). 
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At this point, game theory has not given us any additional information, as we were able to 
find the solution to the game in the previous section. Let us us now address this issue by moving 
on to the next portion of this section. )fwe examine the payoffs in Figure 5.1, it can be seen that 
the outcome that maximizes the joint utility of both agents is not the equilibrium path outcome. 
This occurs when PS chooses Land G chooses M, with payoffs of I and 3, respectively. 
Comparing this outcome to the EPS. PS is just as well off and G is better off. Game theory 
explains exactly why it is rational for a less than optimal outcome to be the EPS using the 
concept of a sub-game perfect equilibrium (SGPE). 
First, let us define the sub-game. It is simply a game which starts at a decision node 
(Friedman 43). There are three sub-games in Figure 5.1; in fact the entire game itself can be 
classified as a sub-game. The idea of an SGPE is that an agent behaves rationally at each of that 
agent's decision nodes. This rational decision making at each node is called a strategy. A strategy 
will be denoted by brackets O. PS has only one decision node and thus only has two strategies of 
{e = H} and {e = L} (e represents PS expectation). G has two decision nodes, and it has 
strategies of the following form: {ife = H, then c = M; ife = L, then c =A}, where c represents 
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the policy choice that G makes. What defines an SGPE is that, for all sub-games in a game, the 
agent that must make a choice at the beginning of the sub-game must have a rational strategy 
from that point forward, given the other agent's chosen strategy (Carlin 644). Our game is 
relatively simple in that the two sub-games which start at G decision nodes, no further strategies 
need be taken into account since they are terminal decision nodes. At the sub-game that starts at 
the PS decision node, PS only has to consider G's strategy from that point forward. These 
considerations are represented by the thick dashed lines in Figure 5.1. Because of their nature, 
there is a guaranteed SGPE for games of this form (Carlin 644). 
To summarize, what we have discovered so far is that solving finite games with backward 
induction implies that the solution is an SGPE. This means that non-credible commitments or 
threats can be identified, and game theory has proven itself very useful in determining why time-
inconsistency problems occur between agents that are acting rationaJJy. In the interest of 
applicability to real world situations, there is still one problem we must address. In our time-
inconsistency game, both players had complete information, meaning that the payoffs and 
strategies of each agent were known to both agents. Games of this sort certainly do occur, but 
games of incomplete information are typically more interesting and more important in economic 
applications. Let us turn our attention to games of incomplete information presently. 
Consider the possibility that in order to reduce the problem of time-inconsistency, the 
government delegates authority for monetary policy to an institution with stronger incentives to 
fight inflation. This institution usually takes the form of a central bank (CB). This may sound 
like a good idea, but of course, the central bank may be a farce and simply act as a government 
puppet. When this is the case, the bank follows the same kind of policy decisions made by the 
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government in the preceding example. The key difference, however, is that the private sector 
would not initially know which kind of central bank it is dealing with. This creates a kind of 
game where one agent lacks information about the preferences of the other agent. This presents 
the latter agent with the opportunity of sending a signal (either truthful or misleading) to the 
former indicating what those preferences are. Let us now turn to an example where there is 
uncertainty for the private sector about the central bank's preferences. 
Let us first outline the game. There are three moves in this game, presented in Figure 5.2. 
Decision nodes are represented by large dots, and the game begins at the central dot, where 
nature (N) determines the type ofCB, moving the game to either decision node CBT or CBw with 
probabilities of a or I-a, respectively. This determination is not observed by PS, who only 
knows the respective probabilities of the determination. Next, CB moves by either signaling high 
(If) or low (L) level of output. This move is observed by PS, but PS does not know whether the 
move was made by CBT or CB w. 
Suppose that L was signaled. If the type ofCB was CBT, then the game moves from the 
CBT decision node to the top left PS decision node. If the type ofCB was CB w, then the game 
moves from the CBw decision node to the bottom left PS decision node. Thus, PS knows that it is 
at one of the two decision nodes on the left, but it does not know which particular node it is at 
because it does not know the type ofCB it is dealing with. When this situation occurs in a game, 
the decision nodes involved are called an information set (Carlin 653). Information sets are 
shown as dashed lines connecting relevant decision nodes in Figure 5.2. In games, when it is an 
agent's turn to move, the agent always knows which information set it is at, but does not 
necessarily know which particular decision node it is at. In our example, we supposed L was 
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signaled, so PS knows that it is at the left hand information set but does not know if it is at the 
top or bottom decision node. At this point, PS must make its move, choosing to expect either 
high (h) or low(!) inflation. The game then ends with the payoffs, the top number representing 
the payoff to CB and the bottom number to PS. 
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Let us now take a moment to discuss the rationale behind the payoff structure, beginning with 
payoffs to PS. Remember that the choice of H or L by CB is only a signal to PS of the policy it 
will choose, not its actual choice of policy. We assume that the tough central bank, CBT, will 
always choose L regardless of the signal it sends to PS. Thus, ifCBT signals Land PS chooses I, 
expectations will match inflation levels and PS gets a payoff of I. If CBT signals Land PS 
chooses h, expectations will not match inflation levels and PS gets a payoff of O. The weak 
central bank, CBw, will always pursue H regardless of its signal to PS. Thus, ifCB w signals L 
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and PS chooses h, then expectations will match inflation and PS gets a payoff of I. Conversely, if 
CBw signals Land PS chooses I, expectations wi II not match match inflation and PS gets a payoff 
ofO. Similar rational can be used to analyze the PS payoffs of the right information set. 
Now let us turn to payoffs for CB. The tough bank, CBT, prefers to signal L and prefers 
PS to choose I. Thus, it receives its highest payoff of 4 when th is occurs. I f only one of its 
preferences are met (either it signals L or PS chooses I), then the payoffwill be 2. Ifneither of its 
preferences are met (it signals Hand PS chooses h), it receives its lowest payoff of O. The weak 
bank, CBw, prefers to signal H and prefers PS to choose I. It receives its highest payoff of 4 when 
this happens. When only one of these preferences are met, it will receive a payoffof2, and 
receives a payoff of 0 if neither preference is met. 
Before we begin to analyze this game in detail, one further point needs to be made. Just 
because PS does not know which particular decision node it is at in a given information set, this 
does not inhibit it from making a sensible guess. In fact, in this type of game, it is a crucial 
element that PS does its best to determine the probability of being at one decision node as 
opposed to the other. Let us use A. to represent the probability that PS assigns to being at the top 
decision node in the right information set, making I-A. be the probability of being at the bottom 
decision node. Similarly, n: will represent the probability of being at the top decision node in the 
left information set, J-n: being the probability of being at the bottom decision node. 
When looking for a possible equilibrium in a signaling game, we must leave the concept 
of the SGPE behind. This is because it can only fully solve games in the absence of uncertainty 
about which decision node an agent is at. This is due to the fact SGPE checks rational behavior 
of an agent if their move begins a sub-game, which only start from single decision nodes. 
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Therefore, the concept of SGPE is not very useful for games containing information sets, but the 
basic idea behind them can be altered for use in such games. This is called a Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium (PBE), which accounts for the uncertainty contained in an information set. A PBE 
essentially has three conditions. The first is that at each information set, the agent whose turn it is 
to move must assign probabilities to the decision nodes within the set, and these probabilities are 
assumed to be known by aJJ agents. Second, given these probabil ities, the agent's strategy from 
then on must take into account the strategies of other players from that point forward. Finally, the 
probabilities must be chosen as rationally as possible given the strategies of the agents. Let us 
apply the concept of PBE to our game in order to see how it works. 
We begin by assigning probabilities within the information sets. There are two sets, one 
corresponding to a CB signal of H and the other corresponding to a signal of L. Let us consider 
information set L. Again, all PS knows is that L has been signaled, and that there is a rr chance 
that CB is CBT and a I-rr chance that CB is CB w. Now let us consider the strategies given these 
probability assignments. When signal L is received, the expected payoff to PS ifit chooses his: 
and the expected payoff to PS if it chooses I is: 
This means that PS should choose h ifrr < .S and choose I ifrr > .S. This should have some 
intuitive appeal. It means that PS will choose I if the likelihood of the central bank being tough 
is relatively high compared to the likelihood of it being weak. 
Now let us look at things from the perspective of the central bank. Let us start by 
considering the tough bank CBT, specifically if it pays to choose L. if rr > .5, it is clearly a good 
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strategy to pick L, because then PS will choose I and the payoff to CB will be 4. Should CBT 
choose H, the best possible payoff that CB could receive is 2, regardless of the choice PS makes. 
Thus CBT is clearly better off choosing L. Now let us consider the weak central bank, CBw. If 
CBw chooses L and if 7t > .5, then PS would choose I and the payoff would be 2. Suppose CBw 
chooses to signal H. The payoff that it receives is now dependent on A, which we can determine 
using the assumption that PS behaves rationally. PS can reason that CBT can get at best a payoff 
of 4 and at worst a payoff of 2 by choosing L, whereas it receives a payoff of 2 at best and Oat 
worst by choosing H. This implies that it would never be rational for CBT to signal H, and 
therefore PS should assign a probability ofO to A. Thus, if H is signaled, PS can infer that the 
central bank is CBw and therefore would choose h. This eliminates the possibility ofCBw 
receiving a payoff of 4, which makes the value of x critical. 
If x < 0, then CBw will be better off choosing L, following the same strategy that CBT 
follows. When this is the case, L is called a pooling equilibrium (both types of banks are pooling 
on the same strategy). If x> 0, then CBw will be better off choosing to signal H, following the 
opposite strategy that CBT follows. In this case, the difference in strategy is called a separating 
equilibrium (the signal selected separates the two types of banks). Finally, if x = 0, then CBw will 
be indifferent as to which signal it selects. What we have discovered is that in situations of 
uncertainty, expectations (and the probabilities associated with them) have a strong impact on 
optimal policy choices. Additionally, we have seen that signals which agents send to one another 
have an important impact because they can influence these expectations . It is ultimately incentive 
structures (payoffs) that determine the significance of signals and how they are used by agents. 
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Conclusion: 
The goal of this paper has been to establish the prevalence of decision making in our 
lives, the processes we go through in order to make optimal decisions, and the implications of 
these decisions in the real world. We have seen simple decisions such as those made by players 
in a tennis match. We have also seen complex decisions such as the private sector making 
expectations for inflation based on incomplete in formation about the nature of a central bank. 
The theories and decision making situations discussed have often had significant impacts on real 
world phenomena, as we saw with the savings rate in the United States being affected by the age 
structure of the country and the resulting consumption decisions. Hopefully by carefully 
examining the way in which we make decisions, we can come up with ways to work around 
problems and make even better decisions. While this paper has not been extremely extensive or 
exhaustive on the topic of decision making, it does provide an introduction to relevant ideas 
which can be studied in more detail to gain further knowledge and understanding. 
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Appendix. Another Application of the Permanent Income Hypothesis: 
Let us take a look at what happens when there is an unexpected decrease in income near 
the end of the middle period of life. At this point, savings are likely being built up in preparation 
for retirement. Suppose that each period in the base case (Table 2 . J) consists of 30 years for a 
total lifetime of90 years. Further, let us assume that at the end of the fifteenth year of the middle 
period, an increase in taxes diminishes current income and the ability to accrue savings. The 
result is that income (I) in the last 15 years of(M) and all 30 years of(L) is decreased by $15. 
This is summarized in Table A.I. 
Base Case 
PI=C 
Table A.I 
E 
$75 
$100 
M 
" ".- I 
;$1501$135 " 
$1001$85 
L 
$60 
$85 
Table A.I shows that permanent income is also decreased by $15 in the latter part of the 
middle period and during the late period. The agent at this point has two options. First, the agent 
can accept the decrease in permanent income and adjust to less consumption and therefore a 
lower standard of living. Second, the agent could choose to work longer and thus maintain the 
original permanent income of$100. The agent's problem is then deciding how much longer it is 
necessary to work. Total lifetime left is 45 years, so in order to have a permanent income of 
$100, remaining lifetime income must be $4,500, as shown by the permanent income equation. 
$4500 
45 
' =$ 100 per year 
years 
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Now, using this information along with some algebra, the number of additional working 
years can be calculated. This process is shown below. 
I.) First, it is known that income in the second half of the middle period and income in the 
late period must add up to $4,500. This can be represented by the equation : 
135M +60L=4,500 (I) 
II.) Second, it is known that the number of middle period years and late period years must 
add up to 45. This can be represented by the equation: 
M+L=45 (2) 
III.) Equations (I) and (2) form what is called a system of equations, shown below: 
135M +60L=4,500 
M + L =45 (3) 
IV.) This system of equations can be solved in a number of ways. One of the most 
straightforward ways to solve the system is called elimination. The first step is to multiply one of 
the equations in the system by a number that will make the coefficient in front of one of the 
terms the same in both equations. Let us do this by mUltiplying each term in the second line of 
(3) by 60 to get the following: 
135 M +60 L =4,500 
60M +60L=2,700 (4) 
v.) The next step is to eliminate one of the terms by addition or subtraction. In our system of 
equations (4), this can be done by subtracting the second line from the first line as shown below: 
135 M +60L =4,500 
-60M-60L=-2,700 
75M =1,800 
(5) 
VI.) We can now solve for M by dividing the last line in (5) by 75 to get the result: 
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M=24 (6) 
Vll.) Finally, we can substitute (6) into (2) to obtain L as shown below: 
24+L=45 --4 L=21 (7) 
What we have discovered is that the agent must now work for 24 more years as opposed 
to 15 more years before the income change. In other words, the late period has been shortened 
from 30 years to 21 years in order to main permanent income and consumption levels. Whether 
agents go through this process explicitly or implicitly, Permanent Income Hypothesis suggests 
that negative shocks to income create an incentive for agents to work longer than originally 
intended in order to maintain a standard of Jiving. 
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